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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the careers from a sample of more than
1,000 top French chefs over more than twenty years and link it to
the success or reputation of the restaurants where they have worked.
This allows us to test what are the determinants of success but also
to investigate the dynamics of performance and reputation, stressing
the importance of the quality of apprenticeships, mentoring and entre-
preneurship spirit. We find that the prestige of the restaurant where
individuals work is on average declining along the career, and that the
quality of apprenticeship is strongly related to the future success as
chef. We also find that prices of restaurants with higher reputation
are more sensitive to bad signals.
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1 Introduction
For most chefs, having his restaurant being awarded one or more stars in the
famous Michelin Guide Rouge represents a major achievement, a recognition
of their work, and also increased notoriety generating a significant stream
of future revenues. In this specific industry, experts play a decisive role,
and reputation of restaurants and chefs are basically established according
to their opinions. The aim of this paper is to analyze how these reputations
are made and unmade and to understand better the development of careers
in this highly creative occupation. Thanks to the richness of our dataset, we
are able to observe the birth of a “star” and its evolution in the constellation
of stars forming the French gastronomic scene.
We first describe the typical career of a chef, explaining the diﬀerent
stages of the career and looking at the determinants of performance along
the career. We find that careers follow a particular path. At an earlier stage
of their career, after graduating from a culinary school, individuals learn the
untaught tricks of the profession by assisting diﬀerent accomplished chefs
at various stages of the meal preparation, starting as commis de cuisine,
then chef de partie and then second de cuisine, or main assistant. This
apprenticeship process is nicknamed Tour de France as young chefs travel
through the country and sometimes beyond to improve their knowledge and
benefit from various experiences at the best restaurants. We show that the
quality of the restaurant where an individual works on average declines over
the career. In other words, individuals start their careers in restaurants
with the highest reputation, and gradually move to restaurants with a lower
reputation along their apprenticeship. At the end of this apprenticeship, they
usually start they own restaurant starting from scratch, and gradually build
their own reputation.
We are especially interested in the process of initial accumulation of hu-
man capital. We use a quality-weighted measure of apprenticeship human
capital measuring the quality of the apprenticeship received during the early
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stage of the career, and measure its eﬀect on the determinants of later suc-
cess. We find that these measures of accumulated human capital are a key
determinant of the performance as chef de cuisine. The quality of appren-
ticeship appears to be particularly important at an intermediate level (chef
de partie) and, to a less extent, at the end of the apprenticeship (second de
cuisine).
We then measure the consequences of reaching the stars. We estimate
hedonic price regressions and find that an additional star translates into a
15% price increase for a typical menu. We also estimate a regression in
first diﬀerence, looking at the change in price associated with a change in
stars. While the overall eﬀect is positive, we find that the eﬀect is stronger
the higher was the prestige of the restaurant the previous year, and also that
change in prices are more sensitive to downgradings than to upgradings. The
first result is in line with the theoretical predictions frommodels of reputation
like Diamond (1989).
We contribute to three very diﬀerent strands of the literature. First,
a long tradition in labor economics has investigated individual careers and
the dynamics of productivity over the career. Starting with the theoretical
work of Becker, Mincer and Ben-Porath on human capital, the literature on
learning (Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Farber and Gibbons, 1996), or on career
concerns (Holmström, 1982), and more recently on careers in organizations
(Gibbons and Waldman, 1999a,b), these authors have tried to understand
what is driving careers.
Empirical work has attempted to validate some key predictions of some
of these theories using personal information from mutual fund managers
(Chevallier and Ellison, 1999), financial analysts (Hong, Kubik and Solomon,
2000; Hong and Kubik, 2003), academic economists (Coupé, Smeets and
Warzynski, 2006a,b,c; Oyer, 2006). Others have documented the career dy-
namics in single firms (Baker, Gibbs and Holmströn, 1994a,b and followers)
and have linked their findings to various theories. We bring some additional
light by stressing the importance of the quality of initial apprenticeship hu-
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man capital as a determinant of success and by documenting careers and the
dynamics of performance in the specific context of haute cuisine.
Secondly, a relatively large and mostly theoretical literature studies the
importance of reputation in contractual agreements (Milgrom and Roberts,
1982; Kreps andWilson, 1982; Diamond, 1989; see Cabral, 2005 for a compar-
ative description). Reputation is described as a valuable asset, built through
repeated interactions where actors update their beliefs about the type of
the other contracting party, that firms use as a competitive advantage. We
document the emergence of reputation and measure the consequence of this
reputation building on the price that restaurants can charge.
Thirdly, a small literature studies the economics and management of gas-
tronomy. A few papers discuss the leadership qualities of the top French
chefs (Balazs, 2001, 2002). Chossat and Gergaud (2003) look at the eﬀect of
the quality of the setting on experts’ opinion and find a positive relationship.
The paper more closely associated to our work is Durand, Monin and Rao
(2001). Building on the the resource-based view of the firm, they discuss
how chefs are able to improve their resource or reputation (measured by an
increase in the number of Michelin stars) through innovation and investment
in general human capital. However, none of these papers analyze the dynam-
ics of careers, nor analyze the initial accumulation of human capital as key
determinant for future success.
Section 2 describes the construction of the dataset and provides some
summary statistics. Sections 3 details our empirical methodology, while sec-
tion 4 shows our results. Section 5 concludes and provides suggestions for
future research.
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2 Data
Our dataset is constructed by combining two sources of data. The first
dataset describes the careers of 1,000 top chefs in French gastronomy, as
assessed by the guide Le Botin Gourmand in their book Les Etoiles de la
Gastronomie Française published in 2001. The second consists of the Miche-
lin books Guide Rouge from 1980 to 2001.
The first source associates the name of the chef to name of the restau-
rant, its location, a clear description of the career similar to a vitae (i.e.
which type of job at which restaurant over which period of time), as well as
other individual information such as the gender, the date of birth, the type
of education (the diﬀerent types of degrees obtained and the date of gradu-
ation), information about apprenticeships, and whether he learned by itself
(autodidacte). The second source provides, associated to the name of the
restaurant, the location, presence of an hotel, the minimum and maximum
prices for a menu, and also a remark as to whether it is necessary or advised
to call in advance. More importantly, it provides for each restaurant ranked
by Michelin two measures of quality: the quality of the food as measured by
the number of stars (on a scale from 0 to 3), and the quality or luxury of
the setting as measured by the number (and color) of forks (or houses), on
a scale from 0 to 5. Chefs from restaurants with at least one star are also
asked to indicate three recipes among their specialties. We then merged the
two datasets by location, restaurant and by year.
Table 1 shows the number of individuals working in Michelin starred
restaurants by year. By construction, our dataset contains a succession of
new cohorts arriving on the market and a few incumbents who were already
chefs before 1980.
The job structure in the industry is very clearly defined and hierarchical.
At the top of the hierarchy are the chefs. They are assisted by their second
de cuisine. Lower in the hierarchy are chef de partie and commis de cuisine,
who assist at diﬀerent stages of the process. Table 2 shows the evolution of
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the distribution of jobs over our period of analysis. Again, by construction,
we see that the proportion of chefs and, to a lower extent, of seconds de
cuisine is increasing with time, while the proportion of chef de partie and
commis de cuisine is declining.
Concentrating on the firm/restaurant side, Figure 1 shows the evolution
of the average price (not controlling for inflation) and the price ratio between
restaurant categories. We can clearly see that the price diﬀerence between
3-stars restaurant and the other categories increases gradually, suggesting a
superstar eﬀect.
Table 3 shows the transition matrix in and out of the Michelin guide, as
well as the star transition. We observe that there is more upward mobility
(probably as a consequence of our sample selection) and also quite a lot of
persistence. Persistence is also much higher at the top than at the bottom1.
3 Empirical Methodology and Results
3.1 Stylized facts about prestige of the restaurant and
career dynamics
We start by linking the prestige of the restaurant to the career dynamics.
Table 4 shows the percentage of individuals working in diﬀerent subsets of
restaurants ranked by quality at various stages of their careers. A striking
pattern is that the prestige of the restaurant is higher at the beginning of
the career: commis de cuisine and chefs de partie work on average in higher-
quality restaurants than seconds de cuisine, themselves working in higher-
quality restaurants than chef de cuisine This should come as no surprise
as individuals at the beginning of their career tour the best restaurants in
the country, learning the techniques from the most famous chefs. This fact
can partly be explained by the selective nature of our sample. However,
it also provides an interesting description of the typical pattern regarding
1See Schumacher (2009) for a theoretical motivation.
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career dynamics and reputation building for our subset of highly talented
individuals: after learning from all these top chefs, individuals start from
scratch, become chefs themselves and start with no reputation. We turn
next to what can explain their success of their restaurant once they become
chef.
3.2 Eﬀect of “apprenticeship human capital”
In the second part, we only consider the subset of individuals who have
reached the level of chef and try to understand which factors aﬀect their
performance, or the prestige of the restaurant they work at. In particular,
we stress the importance of the quality of the apprenticeship human capital
accumulated at the earlier stage of the career. As we have just seen in the
previous step, individuals spend their apprenticeship learning in the restau-
rants with well established reputation. Obviously, some are more lucky or
talented than others and end up in better places. So how does the quality
of the restaurant where you worked as commis de cuisine, chef de partie or
second de cuisine aﬀects your success as a chef? To study this, we create a
measure of quality weighted accumulation of apprenticeship human capital
by summing the number of stars accumulated over the years at the various
stages of your career. We then look at the eﬀect of this variable on perfor-
mance as a chef:
Performanceijt = f
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
Genderi, Ageit, Age2it, Educationit,
Stars accumulated as second de cuisine,
Stars accumulated as chef de partie,
Stars accumulated as commis de cuisine
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
Tables 5 to 7 show the results. It appears that the quality of appren-
ticeship has an important eﬀect on performance, as the stars accumulated,
especially as chef de partie, impacts on the presence in the Michelin and the
number of stars as a chef. This could indicate either that there is a selection
between individuals to be selected as chef de partie in the best restaurants,
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or/and that you need to be suﬃciently close to the chef to really learn from
him, what might not be the case as commis de cuisine. Finally, the fact that
the number of stars accumulated as second de cuisine is only significant in
one specification could be linked to the diﬀerent career choices that individ-
uals make, as some individuals might wait a long time as second de cuisine
that the chef retires to take over the restaurant, while others would start
rapidly on their own. We study that decision more carefully in a companion
paper.
3.3 Hedonic price regressions
As a third part, we measure the consequence of reaching the stars and link
the average price of a menu to the number of stars awarded to the restaurant,
We also look at the eﬀect of the quality of the setting on the average price
charged.
logPit = g(Stars, Forks, Location)
In table 8,we find that, on average, an extra star is associated with a
15% price increase, reflecting the increased value the consumer is expected
to receive in his plate. The quality of the setting is also associated with
higher price.
We next analyze more precisely the dynamic relationship between price
and performance, stressing the importance of reputation. We test change
in performance should matter diﬀerently whether you were a three stars
restaurant or a restaurant with no star. We run a simple first diﬀerence
regression between the change in price and the change in stars, as well as
the interaction between the change in stars and the past reputation of the
restaurant, and the interaction between the change in stars and the type of
change (positive or negative assessment):
d logPit = dStarsit + dStarsit ∗ Positive+ dStarsit ∗ Re putationi(t−1)
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Table 9 shows the results. We find that the relationship between a change
in performance and a change in price is much stronger at the top of the
prestige ladder than at the bottom. In others words, a bad signal is much
more costly when a firm has acquired a high level of reputation, in line with
the theoretical predictions from several models of reputation like Diamond
(1989). We also find that change in prices are more sensitive to downgradings
than to upgradings.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the career patterns of a subset of top French chefs.
We described a few stylized facts about this specific labor markets: the qual-
ity of the workplace is on average higher at the beginning of the career. This
is consistent with the idea that individuals acquire human capital on the
job and then start their own firm from scratch using the tools they have
learned by observing the best chefs at work. We then tested whether this
reputational human capital had an impact on future performance. Our re-
sults confirmed our prior that the quality of the restaurant where individuals
learned the profession had a significant impact on the probability to enter in
the Michelin and acquire highly valuable stars. We also analyzed the pricing
patterns of restaurants. We found that prices were more sensitive to bad
signals for restaurants of higher quality. As such, our paper contributes to
the understanding of the dynamics of reputation.
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Table 1: Number of individuals in Michelin starred restaurants by year
Not in Michelin In Michelin Of which Of which Of which
with one star with two stars with three stars
1980 109 264 91 38 29
1981 108 295 106 44 30
1982 115 319 124 51 28
1983 129 332 109 68 23
1984 140 355 113 65 37
1985 147 379 130 71 36
1986 143 401 150 72 41
1987 169 412 148 75 36
1988 145 444 165 79 38
1989 158 468 178 70 39
1990 162 502 193 80 40
1991 155 538 200 77 39
1992 149 566 222 79 42
1993 132 594 207 84 41
1994 145 593 200 76 37
1995 140 620 211 77 36
1996 129 641 227 77 27
1997 141 646 225 66 27
1998 117 673 230 61 26
1999 106 703 238 68 26
2000 90 718 243 64 25
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Table 2: Evolution of the distribution of jobs
Chef de Second de Chef de Commis de Other
cuisine cuisine partie cuisine
1980 232 18 39 37 61
1981 255 23 42 42 59
1982 266 28 48 48 65
1983 293 26 63 34 59
1984 322 24 66 31 61
1985 339 31 68 34 68
1986 358 36 54 37 80
1987 386 42 57 38 72
1988 409 40 52 34 78
1989 435 40 51 41 78
1990 462 42 49 39 83
1991 484 50 55 33 78
1992 510 49 52 33 77
1993 527 51 53 20 82
1994 552 66 35 22 73
1995 577 67 41 14 69
1996 594 70 33 12 69
1997 624 72 27 9 61
1998 651 75 27 5 40
1999 677 94 11 3 22
2000 690 102 3 2 11
2001 870 111 2 0 15
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Figure 1: Evolution of average price
Evolution of average price (by restaurant category)
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Table 3: Transition matrix
A: Presence in the Michelin
Michelin in t
Michelin in t− 1
No Yes
No 1,649 174
Yes 435 7,173
B. Number of stars
Number if stars in t
Number of stars in t− 1
0 1 2 3
0 3,261 150 - -
1 311 2,556 51 -
2 - 87 800 8
3 - - 17 309
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Table 4: Link between restaurant prestige and job level
Chef de Second de Chef de Commis de
cuisine cuisine partie cuisine
Working in 0-star restaurant 5,690 (58.81%) 676 (55.05%) 352 (35.56%) 267 (43.63%)
Working in 1-star restaurant 2,836 (29.31%) 332 (27.04%) 232 (23.43%) 159 (25.98%)
Working in 2-star restaurant 844 (8.72%) 156 (12.70%) 203 (20.51%) 116 (18.95%)
Working in 3-star restaurant 305 (3.15%) 64 (5.21%) 203 (20.51%) 70 (11.44%)
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Table 5: The eﬀect of initial human capital accumulation on per-
formance (presence in the Michelin). Probit regression (marginal
changes).
Dep. variable: Presence in the Michelin as chef de cuisine
Male 0.25∗∗∗ (0.09)
Age 0.09∗∗∗ (0.013)
Age2 -0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Autodidacte -0.18∗∗∗ (0.07)
Dummy for Paris 0.06 (0.05)
Stars accumulated as second de cuisine -0.01 (0.01)
Stars accumulated as chef de partie 0.032∗∗∗ (0.008)
Stars accumulated as commis de cuisine 0.015 (0.013)
Log-likelihood -3560.19
Pseudo R2 0.037
Number of observations 7120
Note: standard errors in parentheses; ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the
1%/5%/10% level respectively
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Table 6: The eﬀect of initial human capital accumulation on
performance (number of stars in the Michelin). Ordered probit
regresion.
Dep. variable: Number of stars in the Michelin as chef de cuisine
Male 0.16∗ (0.09)
Age 0.016 (0.011)
Age2 0.0002 (0.0001)
Autodidacte -0.019 (0.06)
Dummy for Paris 0.29∗∗∗ (0.05)
Stars accumulated as second de cuisine -0.01 (0.01)
Stars accumulated as chef de partie 0.032∗∗∗ (0.008)
Stars accumulated as commis de cuisine 0.015 (0.013)
Log-likelihood -6158.76
Pseudo R2 0.024
Number of observations 6393
Note: see table 6
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Table 7: The eﬀect of initial human capital accumulation on
performance (number of stars in the Michelin if in the Michelin).
Ordered probit regresion.
Dep. variable: Number of stars in the Michelin as chef de cuisine
(only those in the Michelin)
Male 0.08 (0.10)
Age -0.015 (0.012)
Age2 0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Autodidacte 0.01 (0.07)
Dummy for Paris 0.33∗∗∗ (0.05)
Stars accumulated as second de cuisine 0.027∗∗ (0.012)
Stars accumulated as chef de partie 0.021∗∗∗ (0.007)
Stars accumulated as commis de cuisine 0.002 (0.013)
Log-likelihood -5323.17
Pseudo R2 0.025
Number of observations 4999
Note: see table 6
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Table 8: Hedonic price regression
Dep. variable: logP
One Star 0.17∗∗∗ (0.007)
Two Stars 0.29∗∗∗ (0.010)
Three Stars 0.45∗∗∗ (0.015)
Hotel 0.046∗∗∗ (0.007)
One fork/house -0.20∗∗∗ (0.09)
Two forks/houses -0.002 (0.09)
Three forks/houses 0.13∗∗∗ (0.09)
Four forks/houses 0.31∗∗∗ (0.09)
Five forks/houses 0.41∗∗∗ (0.09)
Color of the forks/houses 0.001 (0.001)
Year dummies YES
Dummy for Paris 0.18∗∗∗ (0.008)
Adj. R2 0.78
Number of observations 7197
Note: see table 6
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Table 9: First diﬀerence estimation
Dep. variable: dlogP
dStars 0.15∗∗∗ (0.03)
dStars if had one star -0.01 (0.03)
dStars if had two stars 0.09∗∗∗ (0.03)
dStars if had three stars 0.10∗∗∗ (0.03)
dStars if Positive -0.12∗∗∗ (0.03)
Adj. R2 0.17
Number of observations 3251
Note: see table 6
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